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Ontario,  respectively. Trade union membership  statistics have a unique 
significance in North America, because they are reasonably 
reliable indicators of trade union power.  They measure the 
extent to which collective bargaining is normalized as a central 
institution in labour markets as well as providing the best 
starting point for gauging the incidence and economic saliency of 
such relationships.  Because of the distinctive  links that the 
institutions common to all North American collective  labour law 
forge between union membership and binding collective agreements, 
union density correlates very highly with the proportion of the 
non-agricultural  labour force that is covered by collective 
agreements.  It is also-reasonable  to surmise that these union 
density data are good indicators of the institutional  importance 
of trade unions -- i.e., their capacities for effective 
"political exchanges"  (Regini 1984).  Such figures would not 
necessarily have the same meanings  in many European countries, 
where different measures of union strength might well be more 
revealing  (Kettler and Meja  1989). 
-2. While such generalizations  about North American 
indicators and labour law are unobjectionable,  differences  in 
patterns of union growth in Canada and the United States raise 
questions about the common tendency to consider industrial 
relations in the two countries as essentially  similar  (Cella and 
Treu 1982), as well as about various approaches that have sought 
to analyze developments  in the legal-political organization  of 
labour markets  in terms of historically  over-general 
abstractions.  We shall argue that differences  in the character 
and pattern of unionization  in the two countries can best be 
understood by reference to the operations of two distinct 
historical formations that are organizational  in character, 
broadly speaking, combining  legal and political dimensions.  The 
principal objective of the exercise is to illustrate a conceptual 
approach and analytical method, and then to defend a 
comparatively  low level of theoretical elegance against a number 
of attractive,  seemingly more powerful alternatives.  In our 
view, the Free Trade Agreement and related political developments 
in Canada add great urgency to the analytical problelirs  we are 
addressing, as do a number of recent proposals for changes in 
labour law and union strategies  (Beatty 1987; Royal Commission 
1985). 
-3- The union growth phenomena to be understood have been 
frequently studied during the past few years.  Starting in the 
late 195Os, the relative extent of unionization  in the United 
. 
States first stagnated and then started to decline, while all 
measures of union involvement in labour relations in Canada began 
a steady increase, which has recently slackened but not 
substantially reversed itself.  This protracted divergence  is 
surprising.  Except for the.latter years of the Great Depression 
and the period of the Second World War, the two sets of union 
density figures -- i.e., the proportion of the non-agricultural 
labor force belonging to unions -- for Canada and the United 
States rarely differ by more than a few percentage points since 
early in the century, and in the ten years prior to 1965, both 
union movements  stabilized at around 30%.  During the following 
twenty years, however, Canadian union density steadily grew 
towards 40%, with only a slight dip during the past four years, 
while the American, so far as can be ascertained from defective 
data, sharply plunged well below the 20% mark  (Weiler 1983; 
Chaison 1982; Rose and Chaison 1985; Baine and Price 1981; Labour 
Canada 1984; Troy and Sheflin 1985; Troy 1986; cp. Huxley, 
Kettler and Struthers 1986, pp. 116-121).  The present authors‘ 
review of these developments concluded, in agreement with most of 
the specialist literature, that neither economic nor 
cultural-ideological  developments  suffice to explain the 
-4- divergences,  although they are doubtless  important.  The critical 
differentiating  factor is generally considered to be the 
contrasting'ways  in which the respective collective  labour law 
regimes condition the responses to structural changes in both the 
economic and the ideological  fields  (Freeman 1985; Kumar 1986; 
Meltz  1985; Rose and Chaison 1985; P. Weiier 1983; J. Weiler 
1986; but cp. Lipset 1986). 
Although there is no single dramatic contrast between 
American and Canadian  legal policy with regard to collective 
labor law, it is nevertheless possible to identify a complex of 
distinguishing  features.  Most Canadian  jurisdictions,.  for 
example, will certify a union as exclusive bargaining agent upon 
evidence that 55-60% of the employees in an administratively 
accepted bargaining unit have signed membership applications, 
while American procedure not only requires a secret referendum as 
well -- which some Canadian  jurisdictions have introduced -- but 
also interprets the employees' choice as an "election" in which 
the employers have "free speech' rights to campaign against the 
union during the sometimes extended-time allowed to elapse 
between application and referendum, with well-documented 
extensive pressure upon employees being the rule rather than the 
exception  (P. Weiler 1983).  Many Canadian  jurisdictions, 
moreover,  impose by law a requirement, achievable in the United 
‘_  5- States jurisdictions where it is not altogether prohibited only 
by collective bargaining at some cost, that all members of a 
certified bargaining unit pay an equivalent to union dues if they 
are not members of the union  (Carter 1982a).  Canadian regulatory 
labour boards have been strengthened by legislative and judicial 
moves towards greater  judicial deference to their findings, as 
well as by substantially  strengthened remedies  (Adams, 1982).  A 
number of prominent  jurisdictions have also moved towards 
imposing settlements by binding arbitration where unions in newly 
certified units are unable to conclude first agreements  (Carter 
1982'a). Although Canadian provinces exercise full power over 
most labor relations and a few have experimented with providing 
inducements for investment at the cost of unions, none has yet 
enacted anything like the "right-to-work" laws of numerous 
American states.  All these distinctive Canadian 
legal-administrative  patterns refer to features that have been 
shown to inhibit unionization  in the United States.  On this 
record, differences  in law and administrative  policy appear 
central to any explanation. 
But analytical isolation of legal or policy variables  _ 
cannot capture the cumulative  impact of different configurations 
of such factors or the context-dependence  of their effects.  Laws 
and policies which sustain unionization  in Canada, for example, 
-60 may well undermine it in Britain.  Such analytical  isolation, 
moreover,  implies an implausible measure of regulatory control in 
the hands of an implausibly coherent sovereign author of law and 
policy.  In our view, the legal and policy differences  that 
properly figure in the explanations  commonly offered are best 
understood as aspects and indicators of contrasting LABOUR 
REGIMES. 
As employed here, the term "regime" draws on two distinct 
usages.  While lawyers often use it to refer to the complex of 
juridified regulations governing some issue domain, recent 
international  relations.theory  has broadened and deepened the 
concept.  The distinctive  feature of "regime" in the latter 
context, and the feature that makes this conceptualization  of 
interest to us, is that it comprehends not only the 
quasi-legalistic  "principles, norms, rules and decision-makers" 
(Krasner 1982, p. 185) around which the expectations of the 
relevant political actors converge ina  given issue area over an' 
identifiable period of time but also the power constellations 
that condition the effectiveness of the institutionalized  order 
in question.  The institution is not reduced to the power factors 
and the power factors are not idealistically denied.  Among 
students of international relations, the point of the concept has 
been to qualify the monistic  "realism" that has dominated their 
-7. study during the past generation, to facilitate inquiry into the 
causal importance of quasi-legalized  institutions where and when 
they can be discerned, without denying the general force of 
power-oriented  systemic theory  (Keohane 1986). 
In adapting the concept to the constitution and 
development of institutions in certain intranational  issue-areas, 
the point is rather to help conceptualize  institutions that have 
an irreducible legal component but that are shaped in important 
measure by the non-legal power resources that participants  bring 
into play.  There are similarities between this conceptualization 
,and  Max Weber's treatment of constitutional  law.  More 
immediately to the point, in the application that we are making 
here, is the parallel between such "regimes" and the collective 
agreement that forms so characteristic a feature of the 
employment domain during the period when awareness of industrial 
relations as a distinctive issue-domain and object of analysis 
grew in importance  (Kettler 1987).  In our work, then, the 
lawyer's "regime" provides the starting point for analysis, but 
the complex of norms and regulations is understood 
~~realisticallyW,  in conjunction with the competing political 
designs and clashing power resources at work in the field. 
As a constituted pattern, a regime embodies a measure of 
-8- resistance to disruptive change: it places constraints upon the 
forms and exercises of power deployed; but both of these 
identity-forming  characteristics  differ significantly  in degree 
from regime to regime and from time to time in the life of a 
regime.  A regime may be said to  intend a preferred type of 
outcome, but this teleological design will be manifested  in a 
structural tendency, subject to even quite important exceptions,  J 
and not in a purely instrumental machinery.  To function as a 
regime, it must be accorded a measure of legitimacy by all 
participant actors, and this is rarely consistent with 
transparently one-sided utilities.  Regimes differ as to 
complexity,  flexibility, and tolerance for inner inconsistency or 
conflict.  But they all display that visible blend of legal 
manner and power factors that mark international  law, which was 
the paradigm for the international relations theorists' version 
of the concept, and which has, in fact, been earlier used as a 
model for the analysis of Labour law, realistically understood  in 
its  social effectiveness  (Korsch 1972). 
In the study of labour, then, regime refers to the 
institutionalized political organization of labour markets  (Offe 
19841, comprising'the  patterned interactions among state (and 
possibly other legal and administrative)  agencies, 
employment-dependent  labour, and employers.  The degrees and 
-  9  - forms of organization  of the latter two types of actors will 
obviously make a decisive difference  for the shape of the regime 
concerned.  When applied to the current scene in Canada and the 
United States, the concept recombines the elements that are 
conventionally distinguished  as the industrial relatio-ns  system 
and its public policy environment.  Without denying the 
possibility of a regime in which an autonomous 
collective-bargaining  system is governed by a state maintained 
"settlement", which has been the paradigmatic model for both the 
most-common  prevalent approach and for its principal adversaries, 
our proposed conceptual shift is designed to facilitate inquiry 
into the political dynamics of any.such regime as well as into  . 
its historical  sources and competitors. 
In locating legal and administrative designs within 
regimes, in short, we mean to emphasize their direct 
relationships with the patterns of practice by the principal 
parties in the industrial relations interactioni to show that 
these are integral to the patterns, as well as their relationship 
with the political constellations constituted by the direct 
involvement of these parties in political life (see, for example, 
the treatment of the "organizational practice" of the German 
labour movement  in Loesche 1983).  The differences  in 
governmental policies and practices must be seen in conjunction 
-  10 - with differences  in the outlooks and activities of unions and 
employers,  for example, serving as factors in the political 
makeup of the regimes.  Kochin and his associates have recently 
developed valuab,le  materials escecially  for the study of 
"strategic choices" by employers  (Kochin 1986).  Our analysis 
will concentrate  rather on the regime-constitutive  politics of 
unions. 
During and immediately after World War II, the familiar 
structure of Canadian and American  labour regimes constituting 
relations among organized  labour, important segments of business, 
and state agencies for the next three decades took shape.  Within 
both nations, these regimes were supported by similar legal 
frameworks, deriving from the design.of the American National 
Labor Relations  (Wagner) Act of 1935 (Brody, 1971; Brody, 1980; 
Jamieson,  1968; MacDowell,  1978).  In return for state 
recognition of workers' rights to collective bargaining,  trade 
unions in both countries agreed to institutionalize  labor 
conflict within a comparatively  narrow terrain of issues bounded 
by legally conditioned terms of entry, legally constituted 
collective agreements, and legally approved tactics.  The 
corresponding agreement by business groups was more reluctant, 
qualified, and by no means universally accepted; and the history 
of the regimes has been marked by persistent efforts by some 
- 11 - parts of the business community -- and intermittent efforts by 
most of them -- to undo it.  The labour regimes, accordingly,  are 
constituted by'continuing  political conflicts, notwithstanding 
their appearance in the form of settled systems. 
The developments  internal to the two parallel North 
American  labour regimes have yielded different outcomes.  Whether 
the two sets of cumulative changes in degree should now be 
treated as a reconstitutive  change in either or both cases is 
uncertain, especially  in view of the volatility of the Canadian 
situation, not least because of its political-economic  dependence 
on the United States.  The new **Free  Trade" agreement, taken as a  ’ 
political development quite apart from its legal effects, may 
well work for Canadian adaptation to the American developments. 
Yet the contrasts remain marked at present, and the period of 
contrast is the subject of our study.  The Canadian labor 
regime still establishes an adversarial pattern of collective 
bargaining within legal constraints which limit but also 
legitimate and otherwise normalize the pattern.  In the United 
States, in contrast, the adversarial relationship between the 
principal collective social actors within the labour regime has 
now been moved back a step, in the direction of a patterned 
struggle over the legitimacy and normality of the collective 
bargaining pattern itself.  This contrast is not be understood as 
-120 suggesting the existence of a consistently more  "pro-labor 
policy" in Canada.  Like the labor regimes of other modern 
states, that of Canada is importantly conditioned by the larger 
designs of the state's public economic policies, and especially 
by its attempts to manage the labor market  in the interests of 
buXness-generated  economic growth  (Simitis, 1984; Offe, 1985). 
Compared to the United States, however, this management  has 
proceeded more frequently through attempts at multipartite 
negotiations at the highest level or through ad hoc interventions 
which regulate or supercede'the outcomes of collective bargaining 
in designated classes of cases, especially in the public sector, 
than through a systematic weakening of.the competitive position 
of organized  labor within the adversarial system  (Giles, 1982; 
Panitch and Swartz, 1985; Morin and Leclerc, 1985). 
The existence of an American  labour regime has sometimes 
been obscured because the ordering of labour relations is said to 
have a contractual rather than regulative core, in contrast to 
the regimes in most of western Europe, and to depend on 
voluntarism  rather than intervention  (Lenhoff, 1951; Aaron, 
1982).  This is.essentially  correct, except that it is also 
necessary to recognize that the way in which contractual 
voluntarism is structured is itself a mode of control and also 
subject to considerable interventionist manipulation.  The 
* 13 - interplay between state agencies and social actors gives reality 
to the effective design and constitutes a labour regime.  Because 
Canadian public policy has been less inhibited about direct 
interventions than that of the United States, it has 
correspondingly been less inclined to rely on affecting outcomes 
indirectly through the manipulation  of the parties' bargaining 
strengths or the legal structure of contract itself  (Dahl and 
Lindblom, 1953; Kennedy, 1976: Risk, 1981; Pentland, 1968; 
Craven, 1980).  Closely related to this difference  is the higher 
level of welfare-oriented  employment law in Canada, covering 
standards, conditions, and terms of employment.  Contrary to 
common-sense expectations, historically  shared by important 
segments of the American trade union movement, such legislation 
has generally served to strengthen unions rather than to render 
them redundant  (Langille, 1981; Clarke, 1982; Swinton, 1982; 
Harrison, 1984; Lewis, 1982). 
As the competitive position of American industry has 
worsened, American legal policy has given increasing scope to 
employer resistance to unionization and collective agreement, as 
well as restricting the scope of legal bargaining  (and thus the 
incentives to unionization),  thereby opening the way for 
employer-controlled  patterns of adaptation to change  (Block and 
McLennan,  1985).  In contrast, most Canadian  jurisdictions have 
- 14 - reinforced collective bargaining  as the norm in most branches of 
non-agricultural  employment.  State labor market policy  in Canada 
has relied upon a combination of neo-corporatist  mechanisms  and 
ad hoc "exceptional" interventions  to steer adaptations  to 
changing conditions, building  in both types of cases upon the 
normalization  of collective bargaining relations and collective 
agreement  (Adams, 1985; Panitch and Swartz, 1985). 
In locating these legal 
"regimes," we mean to emphasize 
the patterns of practice by the 
and administrative  designs within 
their direct relationships  with 
principal parties in the 
industrial relations.interaction,  which also form part of the 
regime, and with the political constellations  constituted by the 
direct involvement of these parties in political  life.  The 
differences  in governmental  policies and practices must be seen 
in conjunction with differences  in the outlook and activities of 
unions, as vital factors in the political makeup of the two 
regimes.  Employers  in America are more apt in general to pursue 
the goal of "union-free organizations",  especially  in new and 
growing sectors, and unions are more ready.to accept limitations 
imposed by employer resistance.  Similar market conditions,  it 
seems, have had marginally  but still significantly different 
effects on the structure and outcomes of collective  bargaining, 
by virtue of the regime intervening variables.  Canadian 
- 15 - employers and unions are also both more willing to accept one 
another as principal counterparts  in their direct interventions 
in the public policy process, at least in several policy-domains, 
and both commit themselves more directly and bindingly to 
political parties.  Although the New Democratic Party has never 
threatened the preponderant  electoral position of the other two 
parties in federal parliamentary elections, it has occupied a 
strategic position during several periods of minority  government, 
and it has been the gbverning or official opposition party in 
several of the more important provinces, whose governments 
control the bulk of labour policy.  Unlike the American trade 
union movement, which has been divided from an important segment 
of its historical political  support since the conflicts of the 
'sixties, the alliances constituting the NDP have remained 
intact. 
On this level of analysis, the differences between the 
Canadian and American situations depend on differences between 
the political characteristics of the two trade union movements. 
The Canadian movement  has been more aggressive in recent decades, 
more consistently committed to lasting political associations, 
including a labour party occupying an influential position in the 
most important political units, and analogous developments  in 
Quebec.  To characterize this difference, we draw on a recent 
- 16 - attempt by Cella and Treu  (1982) to develop a comprehensive 
comparative  typology of national trade union movements. 
Most relevant for our purposes are the distinctions  they 
make between  "business" and "competitive" unionism.  The former 
they define in the usual way, by "its mainly economic objectives, 
pursued strictly through collective bargaining,  outside stable 
political initiatives, and by relying mostly on direct 
organization at the workplace."  (p. 186)  The latter, in 
contrast, competes at many social and political points on behalf 
of a distinctive  social vision.  "Its objectives are broader; 
they include basic socio-economic reforms and are pursued by 
initiatives both on the economic and political  fronts, often 
highly conflictual, with close 
institutionalized  relationship 
1861  In contrast to Cella and 
North American unionism  simply 
that it is worth thinking of a 
but not necessarily 
with the political system."  (p. 
Treu themselves, who identify all 
with the former model, we  suggest 
continuum between the two types 
and to locate the Canadian movement  significantly closer to the 
Wcompetitiven end of that continuum than the American. 
The three "most decisive variables"  isolated by Cella and 
Treu in distinguishing  between models of unionism suggest the 
need for such a distinction.  In nations characteriied by 
- 17 - "competitive" unionism, density rates range between 30% to 50%; 
there is some degree of "interdependence" between unions and 
political parties: and a more interventionist political system 
typically prevails.  "Business" unionism, in contrast, is 
associated with density rates below 30%, only "occasional" union 
linkages with political parties; and it is located within 
political systems less inclined to intervene directly in the 
sphere of industrial relations.  These variables,  applied by 
Cella and Treu to a wide range of nations, coincide quite closely 
with the three patterns of divergence which have struck most 
recent commentators comparing unionism on both sides of the 
forty-ninth parallel.  Since the mid-1360's  Canadian union 
density rates have sharply deviated from the American trend; the 
ties between the Canadian trade union movement and the New 
Democratic Party in the jurisdictions where most unionists  live 
(and the comparable ties, for a time, between the major 
Francophone federations and the Parti Quebecois in Quebec) are 
more binding and mutually  influential than the corresponding 
links between American  labor organizations and the political 
parties they support; and throughout this century Canada has 
developed,_  in the words of Joseph Weiler,  "a highly managed 
system of collective bargaining  .  .  .  that appears to have more 
rules and regulations  for peacetime than most other western 
industrialized democracies",  including the United States.  The 
- 18 - clearly greater strength of two of these variables  in Canada 
makes it less surprising that the third should also tend to be 
greater, although this level of analysis cannot account for the 
tendencies themselves, their degree or timing.  While an ideal 
type of this sort cannot itself explain the correlations  it 
comprises, it heightens the intelligibility of complex phenomena 
and gives clearer shape to comparisons and more detailed analyses 
(Poggi, 1978, p. xii).  To the extent that the constituent 
factors have been found to cohere regularly in the real world, 
then, we do have some reason for thinking that the type stands 
for a complex of comparatively  stable causal interrelationships, 
even if we have not yet managed to work them out in detail. 
In search of such explanation, we turn, at least for the 
present, to the historical record.  To account for the 
comparatively greater approximation to "competitive*'  unionism in 
Canada, we start with the pattern of state interventionism  in the 
field of public labour policy.  On the one'hand,  it predates by 
more than a half a century both the formation of permanent and 
effective linkages between organized  labour and a party of the 
left, as well as the beginnings of significant divergence  in 
Canadian and American union density rates.  On the other, as 
noted earlier, most commentators agree that it is in the field of 
labour policy that the most convincing explanations  for the 
-19-  . recent divergence  in union density rates are to be found. 
Consequently,  the origins of Canada's  "highly managed  system of 
collective bargaining" are of some contemporary  interest. 
Indeed, it can be argued that if the current American  labour 
relations policy represents a drift back towards a pre-1935 
pattern of voluntarism,  then in Canada the historical precedents 
for such a retreat are less evident.  In one form or another, 
governments in Canada, as in its sister Dominions of Australia 
and New Zealand, have been actively involved in labour relations 
since the turn of the century. 
The dominant aim of the Canadian state in this 
endeavour, most commentators also agree, has not been to foster 
union growth so much as "to secure industrial peace".  "Each of 
the incremental steps along the road to the Canadian collective 
bargaining system," Joseph Weiler writes,  "was in response to 
some sort of industrial crisis, usually a strike"  (J. Weiler, 
1985).  "Compulsion" has been the state's characteristic 
response to such conflicts, in the form of the compulsory 
conciliation and "cooling off periods" of the Industrial Disputes 
Investigation Act at the turn of the century_,  the compulsory union 
recognition and collective bargaining under P.C.1003 in World War 
II, or, more recently, compulsory back-to-work legislation in the 
1970's and 80's.  But the actual constitution of a labour regime 
- 20 - is not a matter of unilateral  state design or control and its 
character cannot be authoritatively  inferred from evidence about 
the intentions of any of the actors whose combined actions gives 
it shape or from the claims about its design which form part of 
the contests  internal to any regime.  The regime concept is meant 
to guard against such mistaken analytical  shortcuts, to provide 
an analytical  frame for the complexity and inconsistency which the 
historical record reveals. 
Although the uniqueness of Canada's highly 
interventionist  style of labour relations has been widely noted 
(Pentland, Williams, Jamieson, Riddell, Weiler), there is no 
agreement on its sources of inspiration.  The most detailed and 
convincing study of these origins by Craven  (1980) suggests that, 
at bottom, the initial propensity  for the Canadian state to 
become directly  involved,  in collective bargaining was 
the vulnerability  of a staples economy, in particular 




business and organized  labour to look to the state for.solutions 
to their difficulties  in dealing with their problems, 
particularly their problems in dealing with each other."  (360.) 
The volatility  of Canada's open, export-oriented  economy not only 
enhanced the likelihood of industrial conflict  (and hence the 
often futile search for mechanisms of conflict avoidance), a 
- 21 - point noted by a number of recent studies  (Weiler, Riddell, 
Lacroix), but it also encouraged both business and labour to turn 
towards an activist state for protection across a wide range of 
industrial fronts.  The result, according to Craven, was to 
establish a different pattern of state, business and labour 
interactions than existed south of the border.  Whereas American- 
business and union leaders before the 1930's opposed legislative 
intervention into the field of collective bargaining, their 
Canadian counterparts  supported it, as early as 1907, even when 
directly affiliated to larger organizations  south of the border 
(Weinstein, 1969; Taft, 1970).  In Canada the need for business-labour 
co-operation over the tariff, combined with both parties' mutual 
dependence on the state for economic assistance in other areas, 
facilitated the entry of the state into the regulation of 
industrial conflict.  As Craven points out, when the importation 
of scientific management techniques and business unionism 
produced a strike epidemic during the first decade of this 
century, "[b]oth employer,and worker organizations  turned to the 
state for aid  .  .  .  in a response typical of class relations in the 
Canadian political economy.  Equally typically, the state 
complied.  Exacerbated class conflict was understood to be a 
tripartite concern in the Canadian context."  (362) 
Once established, this pattern of interventionism 
- 22 - remained an enduring feature of the Canadian  labour regime. 
Although markedly  unsuccessful  in its ostensible aim of reducing 
industrial conflict, the development  of compulsory conciliation 
in "public utilities"  and frequent mediation  elsewhere did serve 
to institutionalize  and to a certain extent legitimize collective 
bargaining within Canada more than within the United States 
before the New Deal. 
However, the Canadian state's quest for industrial peace 
before World War II stopped short of enforcing compulsory  union 
recognition.  Only a 1943 wartime strike wave unequalled  since 
1919, and an unprecedented  surge in popular support for the 
socialist CCF, combined with the peculiar market conditions of 
war, pushed a reluctant Canadian government  into further 
interventionism.  Through P.C. 1003, American Wagner Act 
principles of compulsory union recognition and collective 
bargaining were grafted,  in crisis, onto a labour relations 
regime in which compulsion and extensive state administrative 
intervention had become accepted features  (MacDowell, 1979; 
Webber, 1986).  In contrast to the American Wagner Act 
experience, the Canadian move towards compulsory union 
recognition remained devoid of any stated intention to promote 
union growth as either a desirable democratic objective or an 
economic recovery strategy  (Weiler, 1985, pp. 14-15).  As in the 
- 23 - past,  the prime motivation  remained the containment of industrial 
unrest.  The result, nonetheless,  as Weiler and others have 
pointed out, was a "two-sided public policy that continued the 
dominant strategy of  .  .  . controlling work stoppages but added 
mechanisms which would nurture the spread of collective 
bargaining."  (14) 
In short, Canada's wartime  labour "settlement", although 
derived extensively  from the American model, took shape within a 
different political and economic context;  War, not depression, 
shaped its origins; third-party politics conditioned  its timing; 
and an already well-established  pattern of governmental 
interventionism  into collective bargaining eased the shock of the 
state's more active reach into the sphere of employer-employee 
relationships after the war.  For these reasons, perhaps, 
Canada's adoption of compulsory collective bargaining, although 
more recent than that of the United States, did not encounter the 
immediate post-war legislative backlash represented by the 
Taft-Hartley Act in the United States and has retained a more 
lasting legitimacy.  Indeed, while numerous American  states 
quickly took advantage of the.opportunity to enact "right to 
work" laws, in Canada all province6 outside of Quebec quietly 
incorporated the Wagner Act features of compulsory collective 
bargaining, as well as the agency shop, into their own labour 
- 24 - codes in the early post-war years  (Brady, 1971; J. Weiler,  19861, 
in important measure  simply recognizing achievements which had 
been embodied in key collective agreements during the immediate 
post-war years. 
Although the main theme in the Canadian state's 
interventionist  approach to labour relations has been the 
reduction of industrial conflict and not the promotion of union 
growth, the cumulative effect of these policies has been to 
create a more favorable climate for union development  north of 
the 49th parallel.  The vulnerability which initially prompted 
interventionism  still remains an enduring feature of the Canadian 
economy, with the result that conflict and tripartite mechanisms 
for its resolution remain an important and growing part of the 
Canadian industrial relations scene (Adams, 1985; Riddell,  1986) 
enhancing the potential political leverage of  unions within the 
power constellation underpinning the labour regime.  The greater 
degree of institutionalization  within collective bargaining 
provides a wider scope for administrative  discretion which 
perhaps has served to insulate unions from the worst excesses of 
the employer offensive against unionization  south of the border 
during and since the recent recession.  Finally, the 
complementary  development of labour's politicai resources, 
through the NDP in the post-1961 era has provided an additional 
-  25  - and crucial source of protection  for labour's position within the 
Canadian polity. 
Lipset thinks that the distinctive  character of the 
Canadian ideological field, a greater receptivity of Canada's 
political culture to collectivist designs, stands behind these 
political departures from the American pattern and that it also 
largely accounts for the divergent outcomes in labour's fortunes 
in Canada and the United States in recent decades-(Lipset,  1984; 
Lipset, 1986).  Without simply dismissing his reasoning, we find 
it too indeterminate  for the problem at hand.  Many different 
outcomes other than a divergence in the character of the trade 
union movements, which are of interest here, would be compatible 
with the cultural contrast made, especially since it continues to 
aggregate conservative and socialist indications into a composite 
"collectivism" given form largely by the contrast model of a 
presumed American  "individualism".  We are inclined rather to 
focus on the differing ways in which the various organizations  in 
the two settings -- labour organizations,  above all -- utilize 
their resources to manage quite similar structural problems.  The 
political analysis of labour regimes requires a political theory 
of labour organizations  (Streek, 1981). 
In.sum, we see competitive unionism in Canada and the 
- 26 - labour regime its activities help to shape as'the complex result 
of union activism,  industrial militancy and the response of the 
state, business and labour to the problems of economic 
vulnerability  posed by an export-oriented,  staple economy. 
No analysis of contrasting developments  in the 
organization of two labour markets can ignore differences  in 
economic structures and circumstances,  of course.  But we do not 
find that we can deal with our analytical problem without an 
historical approach, which understands economic factors mostly  in 
their capacity as limits and opportunities  for actors in dynamic 
and internally contested political formations.  In pleading the 
necessities of the specific analytical problem before us, we are 
admitting our modesty -- or uncertainty -- about making the kinds 
of macrotheoretical  judgments which others consider governing  for 
major analytical problems relating to the labour movement.  To 
clarify our position we would nevertheless  like to relate it to 
three major alternative tendencies in the literature. 
We shall start out from the familiar trifurcation of the 
- 27 p literature on industrial relations into unitary, pluralist, and . 
marxist approaches  (Fox, 1974; England, 19821, with each approach 
being linked to a characteristic  set of political commitments 
and/or social interests.  But we are much less interested here in 
an expose#' of ideological bias than we are in sorting out some 
challenging themes in each of the categories and in explaining 
our reluctance to follow any of them in their more systematic 
claims.  Accordingly, we shall comment on one sophisticated and 
powerful theoretical model for each of the three kinds of 
political interpretations  intended by the classification  scheme, 
taking them as interesting and reasonable arguments for the 
respective positions.  This does not mean that we can disregard 
the place of these arguments within a political discourse 
integral to the periodic internal contests about the practical 
meanings which the ambiguous institutions and other relationships 
are to bear, as they are periodically  renegotiated or shifted 
about.  We think that it is fair to'ask proponents  for one or 
another position to consider what they are doing when'they  reason 
as they do.  But we are not content to denounce them when we 
don't like it, especially in a forum where such posturing would 
do nothing except to inhibit critical thinking and learning. 
Ways of knowing in these matters are doubtless  a  part of 
politics; but they may also genuinely be ways of knowing  (Rettler 
Meja, and Stehr, 1984). 
- 28 - Such respectful consideration  is not easy to muster when 
we look at "unitary" arguments which simply reject any autonomous 
role for organized  labour in the economy on the grounds of 
supposedly absolute proprietors' rights or on the grounds of a 
sweeping assertion of the community of interests between 
employers and employees, satisfiable only under untrammeled 
managerial  control.  Nor can we gain much in the present context 
from arguing with anti-union analyses patterned on the reasonings 
of Friedrich Hayek, which would ascribe a hundred and fifty years 
of social development to an inexplicable blunder, when the 
rational merits of the "spontaneous social order" were somehow 
lost from view  (von Mises, 1949; Hayek, 1973, 1976, 1979).  But 
we do find both stimulation and instruction in a different 
theoretical approach which can reasonably  lead to "unitary" 
conclusions when applied to the study of the developments  here 
under review. 
If the decline of American union density  is traced to the 
transformation of the American labour regime, as we have 
proposed, and if this transformation  is linked to massive  . 
employer disregard of the law and systematic under-enforcement  by 
public agencies, as is evident from the historical  record, an 
analysis might plausibly link this development to the more 
-  29  - general contemporary  problem of hyper-legalization  and the 
consequent presumed crisis of legality.  In a recent study of 
this problem, Gunther Teubner  (1984) has combined some elements 
of Luhmann's neo-functionalism  with 
critique of legalization to offer a 
failures of law.  He maintains  that 
elements of Habermas' 
general explanation  for 
-_ 
the effectiveness  of law must 
be understood  in terms of a three-way relationship between three 
differentiated  subsystems of society: politics, the law, and the 
social domain to be regulated.  The course of social development, 
he argues, has seen these subsystems increasingly take on the 
character of autopoietic  systems -- systems which are 
self-reproducing  and self-referential,  controllable only by their 
own essential mechanisms  of reproduction and wholly subject to 
their own cognitive modes.  Politics can get from the law only 
what the law can understand politics to want and the law can 
impose on social actors only what the requirements of their 
social activities permit them to comprehend and to grant.  When 
there is a massive failure of effect -- when courts appear to 
ignore legislation, for example, or illegality becomes the 
practical norm within some social domain such as  the labour 
market -- the first question to consider, on this analysis, 
whether there is such a breakdown of communications  between 
systems. 
is 
- 30 - Utilizing the central concepts of this functionalist 
social theory of differentiated  autopoietic  subsystems  (Luhmann, 
1981; Teubner,  1986; Willke,  1983; Go#'rlitz and Voigt,  1985), a 
plausible way of reading the contrast between American and 
Canadian developments  in the political organization  of the labor 
market would be to suggest that American developments  represent a 
classical case of an autopoietic  system successfully  rejecting a 
disruptive external  intrusion in order to cope with the need to 
reproduce itself under conditions of extreme environmental 
stress.  It was, after all, employers' resistance, often defying 
weak regulatory restraints, which practically  immobilized the 
Wagner Act's regulatory  supports for labor organization  and 
collective bargaining;  and it has been employers'  initiatives 
which have generated alternative mechanisms  for the regulation of 
both external and internal labor markets.  According to this 
interpretation, shifts in the government‘s role within the 
.  labor regime then simply appear as signs that the relevant 
mechanisms within both the political and legal subsystems have 
recognized and acknowledged these limits of the former regulative 
law.  It would follow that unions are now obsolete and that 
collective bargaining has become  (tendentially, at least) a 
dysfunctional mechanism. 
From this standpoint, the divergent Canadian pattern 
- 31 - might well appear as a classical instance of the damage 
inflictable by transgressing  the limitations of law's capacities, 
with costs measured by the lowest productivity  growth rates in 
the OECD and ever more evident structural flaws in the economy as 
a whole.  This appears to be the view of the provincial 
government of British Columbia, which has recently adjusted  its 
collective  labor law so as to bring it closer to the American  (MC 
Murray, 1985; J: Weiler, 1986).  And it may even be a more or 
less conscious rationale underlying recent government policy 
aiming at freer trade with the United States, as well as efforts 
by influential groups to persuade the courts to interpret the 
guarantees of equality provided in the recently-adopted  Charter 
of Rights so as to undermine the privileged position of the 
collective bargaining  regime within the Canadian labor market. 
This is a paradoxical outcome for Teubner's analytical 
approach, since his own objectives are far from hostile to 
collective bargaining or to other modes of redirecting the 
presumed logic of market processes towards ends of social equity 
and other ends associated with the welfare state.  His aim, in 
fact, is to make a case for "reflexive law" as a regulatory 
device, a mod& of legal regulation through the legal constitution 
of self-regulation which has the North American collective 
bargaining regime as its paradigm  (Teubner, 1982; Nonet and 
- 32 - Selznick 1978; Kettler, 1987).  Such law is supposed to be able 
to get through the boundaries of the self-referential  systems and 
to induce adjustments  in self-regulation  which will move in the 
direction of the public purposes intended -- as when collective 
bargaining under the labor regime is said to introduce 
considerations  of equity into decisions on mass  layoffs without 
blatant economic  irrationality  (Gunderson, 1986).  But Teubner's 
hopes cannot control the logic of the approach he has adopted 
(Luhmann, 19851, and the paradox can only be overcome either by 
abandoning the collective bargaining regime under present 
conditions, accepting the "unitary" conclusions  (which follow 
under North American conditions, whatever may be the case where 
co-determination  regimes are established: cp. Teubner 1984, 
Teubner  1985, Teubner 1986a), or by reconsidering the 
functionalist and systems-theoretical  formulation of his insights 
(Kettler, 1986). 
Our preference  is obviously for the latter.  Without 
presuming to offer a counter-sociology  here, it is enough to say 
that we consider the autopoietic  systems model at once too closed 
and too indefinite.  It*'is  too closed because it neglects the 
conflicts, ambiguities and indeterminacies in the complex 
interactions it comprehends, and consequently the role of power 
in its various modes in the constitution of those interactions. 
- 33 - And it is too indefinite because  it seems to apply equally well 
or equally poorly to every conceivable kind of social formation 
-- from a theoretically  constituted entity  like the market or 
industry or the labour relations system to a specific 
organization  like an enterprise or a union or a collective 
bargaining relationship.  The latter feature can of course be 
deployed to evade the consequences  of the former, by breaking 
down the subsystems of functionalist common-sense  into a myriad 
of others, each autopoietic and all interrelated by imperfect 
congruences of unimaginable  complexity.  But then no applications 
or conclusions  can be given general form: we are in a fascinating 
Goethean world, to be admired rather than explained  (Meinecke, 1936). 
At a more mundane and less literal level, we find this 
approach suggestive because it calls attention to the limits of 
direct state regulation and thus, in our view, to the dangers of 
dismissing the collective  labour regime as no longer pertinent  in 
an era of expanding protective employment  law.  It is true that 
collective bargaining  is not a promising mechanism  for achieving 
a number of socially urgent objectives, quite apart from 
questions of fundamental social democratization.  In the 
increas-ingly  dual labour market, unions often sacrifice the 
weaker for the sake of protecting the relatively established 
- 34 - (Simitis, 1984; Offe, 1984).  But these are shortcomings 
can be counteracted  in some measure through the internal 
of unions, as well as through some public constraints on 




internalization  of human rights standards within the terms and 
administration  of collective agreements  (Swan and Swinton, 1982). 
The,alternatives  to these imperfect approaches  seem to be 
‘. 
self-evidently worse or wildly unpredictable.  Teubner's kind of 
functionalist analysis  is very instructive on these matters.  But 
where it leads to inferences about system needs from politically 
determined outcomes of intra-constitutional  conflicts,  as in the 
development of the American  labour regime during the past two 
decades, the approach must be rejected.  There is no destiny 
which countermands a recovery of collective bargaining and 
unionism in the United States, although there are massive  inner 
and outer obstacles in the way; and there is no fate that decrees 
a dismantling of the social constitution of collective  labour in 
Canada, although there are serious and mounting  threats. 
Such obstacles and such threats have been the 
preoccupations of recent writings  generally classed as 
"pluralist".  Interpreting the collective labour regime in the 
light of a conception of-the "industrial relations system" 
centered on the contractual resolution of conflicting collective 
- 35 - preferences  in the employment relationship,  as well as the 
institutionalization  and control of conflict measures,  this 
approach diagnoses the weakness of American unions with 
therapeutic  intent, even as it offers prophylaxis to Canada.  To 
judge by the well-researched  and articulate compilations of this 
literature in the pertinent volumes of recent studies for the 
Canadian Macdonald Commission, many "pluralists" are more 
impressed by the precipitous American decline in unionization 
than they are by the comparative resiliency of Canadian unions. 
They tend to see the problems as due to a drastic loss of public 
trust in unions, on the one hand, and, on the other, to a 
reasonable basis for this loss in obstacles which collective 
bargaining is seen to put in the way of adaptation to dramatic 
economic change  (Riddell, 1986; Kumar, 1986; J. Weiler,  1985). 
For the sake of union recovery and expansion into the newer 
growth areas in the economy, they urge new attention to 
cooperative techniques of labour-management relations and a 
dismantling of adversarial habits of thought and action among 
unionists.  It is important not to fall into political distortion 
in characterizing  this position.  There is substantial regard for 
the autonomy of workers' organization among these writers and 
little disposition to impose new regulations or sanctions on 
them, even in regard to strikes and other-conflict techniques. 
The adaptations they seek are to be fostered by persuasion and 
- 36 - inducements. 
Yet if our analysis of the differences between Canadian 
and American unions is correct, this approach  is wrong in its 
diagnosis and harmful in its prescriptions.  The more  . 
"competitive" type of union movement need not by any means reject 
coordination and collaborative planning with business or 
governmental agencies, but it proceeds here by "political 
exchanges" which presuppose  its competitive  strength and a 
measure of ideological mobilization  (Regini, 1984).  In the North 
American context, we submit, these presuppositions  cannot be met 
without a forceful adversarial  style in collective labour 
relations.  Overpointedly,  our position can be summarized as  a 
preference for "the Canadian experience" over any reincarnation 
of the "American Plan". 
The most interesting contemporary versions of a "marxist" 
approach seriously question whether either one of the North 
American  labour movements can generate the militancy to reinstate 
a credible justification for unions, and they do so precisely 
because they conclude that the leaderships' commitment to the 
existing legal frameworks.have put the organizations  at the mercy 
of state policies now inclining towards a new union-free  labour 
regime.  The argument has two principal parts.  The first, which 
-370  . has historical antecedents  in the debates within many labour 
movements at the beginning of the century, seeks to establish 
that the normalization of unions and collective bargaining by 
means of a legal regime systematically devalues militant 
organization.  In both the United States and Canada, despite 
differences  in the legal means by which the results are achieved, 
exponents of this,approach  emphasize the displacement of 
organizational  strikes by certification procedures and the 
outlawing of strikes during the life of collective agreements, as 
well as the restrictions on matters for collective bargaining 
(Panitch and Swartz, 1985; England, 1982; Klare, 1978; Atleson, 
1983; Tomlins, 1985; Rogers; cp. Korsch, 1972; Erd,-1977).  The 
effect of the labour regime, it is maintained,  has been to 
"deradicalize" the movements whose mobilization  gained this 
measure of recognition, to "integrate industrial conflict within 
the control system of so,ciety"  (England, p. 2711, and to turn 
leaders of unions into "agents of social control over their 
members rather than their spokespersons and organizers"  (Panitch 
and Swartz, p. 145).  The "settlements" which established the 
*'industrial  relations system" around the time of the Second World 
War thus appear as a mode of "capitalist hegemony", a complex of 
"incorporative" and rationalized coercive devices for state 
management of the labour market.  As  developed during the past 
few years, the second part of the argument then goes on to claim 
-38- that economic developments  (especially the "fiscal crisis of the 
state" and key shifts in technology  and international markets) 
now impel the state to move beyond the "free collective 
bargaining system", tentatively  in the direction  of 
"neo-corporatist" cooptation of the labour movement and then in 
the direction of its effective disorganization,  in the name of 
"trust and belief".  While Panitch and Swartz, for example, see 
some hope that the loss of ideological  justifications by 
reference to "social justice" and the end of the legitimation 
derived from self-regulation  under the old established  labour 
regime may rekindle workers' militancy and radicalize their 
organizations,  the main tendency of the "marxist" analysis is to 
despair of these long-tamed organizations. 
While we have learned from the critical political 
commentary associated with this approach, we cannot rely on it as 
a systematic theoretical  framework for.analysis.  The first 
difficulty comes with our choice of analytical problem.  We start 
from the supposition that the differences between the United 
States and Canada with respect to labour union density rates do 
matter, and we cannot make out a clear position on this basic 
point in the "marxist" literature.  The overall approach would 
suggest that these differences make no difference  for future 
developments, or even that a dismantling of the legalized labour 
-  39  - regime might be welcome and the decline of depoliticized  unions 
taken with a shrug.  But many actual applications  of the approach 
seek to amend the legislative or administrative  base of the 
labour regime  (England, 1982) or to fortify its constitutional 
foundations.  Panitch and Swartz paradoxically even cite the 
failure of Canadian unionists to campaign for constitutional 
guarantees of "free collective bargaining" -- a gateway to more 
intensive legalization of the collective labour regime through 
its renewed judicialiiation -- as an indication of their lack of 
militancy.  We are sensitive to the dilemmas created for these 
analysts by the shift between levels of analysis and by bonds of 
solidarity with such labour movement as may exist, but we prefer 
to respond by backing away from the grand theory which makes it 
so hard to make necessary discriminations. 
An analysis founded on a counterfactual model of a labour 
movement coming to revolutionary consciousness  understates the 
difficulties and constant costs of workers' organization  and 
overstates the power and discretion of organized labour and its 
leaders over the century.  A characterization of the collective 
labour regime as a univocal hegemonic expression of capitalist 
domination, reading ideological assertions by certain 
participants in that regime as authoritative revelations of a 
uniform design, underestimates  the continuation of conflict about 
- 40 - the meaning of such constituted orders and'the range of political 
possibilities  internal to them.  Such  distortions  afflict recent 
systematic marxist analyses, despite the ingenuity with which 
correctives  are often sought.  Our approach must remain open to 
a wider variety of considerations. 
We are, in short, indebted to all three of the principal 
types of approaches, but we think that the matters we are 
investigating require a different, more political analysis.  We 
recognize that the concept of labour regime, which we have made 
central to our analysis, needs more work,  just as our comparison 
should be extended to Britain, and perhaps also to Australia,  in 
order to test the powers of the analytical  strategy we are 
developing and to refine its terms.  The present paper aims 
simply-to bring out some of the distinctive  features of the 
approach we applied in our recently published more topical and 
descriptive paper  (Huxley, Kettler and Struthers, 1986).  The 
divergences  in union densities between the United States and 
Canada, we think, are indicative of different developments  within 
the respective labour regimes, brought about, at least in 
important measure, by the contrasting tendencies towards 
"competitive" and "business" unionism.  The study of such 
regimes, in our view, resembles the complex, two-tiered approach 
which has been emerging in recent work on the welfare state by 
- -41  - Skocpol and others, but it pays closer attention to legalized 
modes of state power and to their substantive modifications  in 
social application.  The project hopes ultimately to contribute 
to the advancement of more fully developed political theory in 
this field. 
- 42 0. .  .  . 
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